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I. INTRODUCTION
DISTRIBUTED processing system, comprising a set of dis-A crete processing units, offers the user not only the prospect of increased efficiency and throughput through parallelism, but its inherent redundancy might also be exploited to enhance reliability. To do so requires a properly designed fault tolerance infrastructure which maintains the integrity of the system under fault conditions. This paper describes CSP-based methods which facilitate the placement of fault tolerance software structures across a distributed system to ensure safe operations in the presence of faults.
Notwithstanding the use of standards and guidelines [l], [2], [3] in the design of software-based real-time systems for safety-critical applications, and the concomitant adoption of formal methods, it is probable that faults will still be introduced into a design either explicitly as part of a particular component or implicitly through the omission of a particular feature. It is unrealistic to expect all software design faults to be detected during design and testing, and latent faults may persist into system use [4].
Fault tolerance [5] is often incorporated into a design as a ruggedization process to protect a process or set of processes regarded as critical to safe system operation. The fault tolerance mechanisms are required to recognize faults by the errors they cause and to prevent error migration from the faulty proc-ess to elsewhere in the system, so that error recovery is localized. The extent of the error recovery operation can be limited if a boundary can be identified within the state-space of the distributed system across which error propagation by interprocess communication is impossible; it must include all processes which interact with the function being protected and exclude all processes that do not interact with it. In other words, the state-space of the system has to be partitioned into a hierarchy of atomic actions [6]. It is then possible to introduce a distributed error detection and recovery mechanism around the atomic action [7] which ensures that all the processes affected by the fault cooperate in recovery. This localization of fault tolerance simplifies the design and can help to meet timing constraints in real-time systems [8].
Methods for determining hierarchical sets of atomic actions are not widely known. This paper describes methods which use the mathematically based notation of Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [9] to describe the operation of a distributed system, and the interactions between the processes. The analysis allows the designer to identify hierarchical sets of atomic actions within the design. The model of the system can then be used to place fault tolerance software structures, correctly including all participants.
II. ATOMIC ACTIONS AND FAULT-TOLERANCE
To an external observer the activity of a process is defined by its sequence of external interactions; any internal actions (of which there may be many) can not affect the extemal observer, at least until the next extemal interaction. This allows the concept of an atomic action to be derived [6]: the activity of a set of processes is defined as an atomic action if there are no interactions between that set of processes and the rest of the system for the duration of that activity. The extension to hierarchically nested atomic actions is straightforward. These concepts are well-known in distributed transaction processing [lo] from which field many other attributes of atomic actions, such as serializability, failure atomicity and permanence of effect can be defined.
The process of identifying the atomic actions within a parallel system design brings into clear focus the structure of interprocess interactions and thus the route by which errors might propagate under fault conditions. All common mechanisms for providing fault tolerance in parallel systems, such as forward error recovery [ll] 0098-5589/95$04.00 0 1995 IEEE A generalized fault tolerant mechanism could be considered as a coordinated set of recoverable blocks, with one recoverable block in each interacting process, allowing distributed error detection and recovery. The mechanism is bounded by an entry line, an exit line and two side walls which completely enclose the set of interacting processes which are party to the mechanism, and across which interprocess interactions are prohibited. The structure is indicated diagramatically in Fig. 1 .
The enhy line defmes the start of the atomic action and consists of a coordinated set of recovery points for the participating processes. The exit line comprises a coordinated set of acceptability tests. Only if all participating processes pass their respective acceptability tests is the mechanism deemed successful and all processes exit, in synchronism, from the action. If any acceptability test is failed, recovery is initiated and processing "passed" to another set of recoverable processes. Thus all processes in the atomic action cooperate in error detection.
The duality of atomic actions and recovery mechanisms has been discussed at length in [lo]. Atomic actions can be viewed as modeling an "object-action'' type of system where atomic actions operate on objects. Expressed graphically as an action diagram ( Fig. 2) circles represent actions, and arcs show the dependencies between actions. Thus, in Fig. 2 , action A2 uses objects "x" and "y" released by action Al. Similarly, action Ad uses "y" when it has been released by action A2. A comparison with Fig. 1 shows that the recovery mechanism is the dual of the action and the process is the dual of the object; a mechanism Ci is replaced by action Ai with an arc connecting Ai with Aj if Ci and C, have processes in common. Thus, Fig. 2b and Fig. 2c can be regarded as duals. In the context of this paper, for example, action A3 provides a fault tolerant function operating on processes P, Q, and R.
Any attempt to incorporate an entry line and an exit line at arbitrary locations in a concurrent system is unlikely to lead to a properly formed recovery mechanism. It is necessary to identify a boundary within the state space of the complete set of processes across which error propagation by communication is prevented. Clearly, this boundary will be the boundary of an atomic action, since such a boundary of necessiQ prohibits the passing of information to any process not involved in the atomic action and similarly embraces all interacting processes within the atomic action. Recovery mechanisms can be nested and for handling problems which occur if the chosen mechanism is incorrectly located, have received more detailed attention than the fundamental problem of placing the mechanisms correctly. Correctly placed mechanisms, coincident with atomic action boundaries, avoid error propagation problems. This paper is concemed with the analysis of a prototype design for atomic actions. Ideally, a design method would incorporate the requisite, appropriately placed, atomic actions and the associated fault tolerance infrastructure into a system with a minimal amount of reanalysis and redesign, and an eventual goal is to define such a design method. However, the techniques are still insuficiently mature for this to be achieved and consequently this paper retains the normal design practice in which fault tolerance mechanisms are superimposed upon selected atomic actions and the new designs subjected to reanalysis.
STATE SPACE METHODS FOR IDENTIFYING ATOMIC ACTIONS
Substantial work has been performed on the ability to model systems, and to reason about their behavior, using state space representations such as Petri nets or GMB [20], [21] . In the Petri net approach, each process state can be associated with a Petri net place, and each state transition with a Petri net transition [22] . Process execution is simulated by allowing marking tokens to flow through the Petri net. From the formulation of a reachability graph, the behavior of the Petri net, and therefore of the modeled system, can be analyzed.
Experience with occam [23] as a design language for loosely-coupled real-time concurrent systems [24] , [25] has led to Petri net methods for identifying atomic actions. By only permitting synchronous, atomic, communications, occam forces communicating processes into mutual synchronization at communication points. This not only imposes a strict discipline on the designer (because errors in the synchronization logic can lead to deadlock) but also leads to a system more J' amenable to analysis. The system is designed using the requirement specification and modeled as a Petri net. Examination of the state reachability graph permits the designer to identify the boundaries of atomic actions. Inspection determines which atomic action boundary encloses which system function, and an appropriate error detection and recovery mechanism to protect any chosen system function can then be incorporated at the level of the atomic action without disturbing the constituent processes or their interprocess actions. Although the method is effective, it requires:
1) translation of an existing textual Occam design into a 2) translation between the graphical Petri net and set theory 3) translation of the identified atomic action entry and exit which are made more difficult because:
4) for all but the simplest examples, there is a computational
Although automated tools exist for these translation processes, often error-prone manual methods are still involved. For Petri-net-based methods the designer must be satisfied that the translation steps 1-3 do not themselves introduce errors.
Occam has a mathematical basis in the theory of Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [9]. CSP permits a fundamental description of a concurrent processing system in terms of the component processes, the interactions between the processes, and interactions with the real-world environment. Since a CSP description is directly amenable to mathematical analysis, it is possible to decide behavioral properties, such as the presence of reachability pathologies, without the need for error-prone translation into a complementary representation. The ability to reason about timeliness in recent extensions to CSP [26] should further promote its use in the design of timecritical and safety critical systems.
The trace of a CSP process is a record of the sequence of events in which a process could engage and indicates directly a possible execution behavior of that process [27] . During the design phase it would be advantageous to determine all the possible traces which a process might produce. This procedure is termed trace evaluation in this paper. For any but the simplest process there will be a number of possible traces; for a set of concurrently executing processes the overall trace set will be all permitted interleavings of the traces of the component processes. If the processes interact only by synchronous communications, then the processes are brought into synchronism for the communication event. The communication event will be in the alphabet of both the communicating processes and will constrain the set of all possible traces.
It is not practicable to create the complete set of traces unless the set of processes is subject to certain constraints:
1) The processes must terminate, or arrive at a previously reached state, in a finite number of steps, else the set of traces becomes infinite. 2) Where program flow is made dependent on the value of variable expressions, static analysis has to consider all graphical Petri net;
or matrix-based methods for reachability analysis; points back to the original Occam design; explosion which could restrict the analysis.
possible values within the range of the variable expression, which may be infinite and lead to an infmite set of traces. 3) No. 2) precludes from analysis classes of loops where trace evaluation would have to evaluate loop guards, and also the use of subscripted communication channels where the subscript is determined by a variable expression. 4)Guarded choice (and thus nondeterminism) can be included provided the truth value of the guard is reflected in the trace set. 5) Interprocess communications occurring in loop constructs pose major problems for trace evaluation; in particularly if the loop iteration is controlled by a variable expression which is even indirectly determined by the real-world environment, then analysis can only be performed for special cases, i.e., where a subset of these environmental values are considered. 6)Certain commonly occurring forms of loop can be handled; for example, if the loop is executed a predefined number of times (e.g., the conventional FOR loop) and the number of communications in both processes exactly match, or if both communicating processes have matched loops which iterate synchronously in both processes (as in the real world robot example).
Trace evaluation can be tedious and error-prone if performed manually, but it may be readily automated. An automated tool, termed CoPla, has been built at the University of York within an X-Windows environment [28] .
Iv. CSP AND ATOMIC ACTION IDENTIFICATION
Trace analysis can be used to identify atomic actions within a CSP design and to infer a hierarchical arrangement of these atomic actions. The technique presented here is inspired by the successful Petri net methods [29] ; it requires the designer to evaluate all the possible execution traces for the CSP design and then to analyze process execution for events which are interprocess communications. By definition, the activity of a set of processes constituting an atomic action is such that no interactions take place between that set of processes and the rest of the system. Consequently the boundary of the atomic action can then be used for the proper incorporation of coordinated error detection and error recovery mechanisms within CSP designs.
Conventionally the complete set of possible traces for a process, P, is designated by where traces(P) = {tl, tz, ..., tk} t, = <e,,, e,Z, ..., e,,, ..., J> and the event e,, corresponds to the jth event in the ith possible trace t,. J is the successful termination event. (Strictly speaking, <e,l>, <e,l, e,p, and all intermediary event sequences are also members of traces(P) as well as <e,l, e,*, ..., e,,, ..., ,/ >; this paper only consider traces
The algorithm for trace evaluation is a straightforward application of continuous simplification. Given P, all the events the termination event.) eil which can be the first element of the trace are extracted, to yield a simpler process P/eil (P after engaging in eil ), thus: traces(P) = traces(e,, A (P / ell))Utraces(ezl A(P / ez,))u . . .
=Utraces(eil A(P/~~~))
i=l where A is the catenation operator. The function traces(eil A (P/ei2)) can then be evaluated in a similar fashion.
Consider N processes in concurrent execution: , appearing in the alphabets of both processes P. , P, , which participate in the communication, and thereby forcing synchronization). For each process P,, the local events 1: form the set L, and the communication events Here, the event g,, corresponds to the jth event in the ith possible trace ti of traces (23) . This general event gij is either an element from the alphabet of one of the constituent processes if it is a local event; otherwise it must appear in the alphabet of exactly two processes as a communication event. Thus:
The method for identifying hierarchically nested atomic actions is defined in algorithms 1 and 2. Algorithm 1 defines how the entry and exit lines to the atomic action are identified.
A. Algorithm 1 obvious extension to more than three processes):
Given three processes P,, P,, P, in parallel execution (with 1) Add before the start of each process the special events:
; recall that the last event in each e: , , e:,il, and process is followed by Jp, , P, and f, respectively.
2) Select a sequence of consecutive events e,9 -5 . . . -> e$ -5 . . . -> e :
. within P, which are to be constituents of the atomic action. The sequence must enclose fully any parallel or selection constructs within the sequence. Note that e$i, and JP will not be part of this sequence. 3) Defme the empty sets S, F, K, J.
S := {}; F := {}; K := {}; J := {} 4) Generate traces(F), (including e$$ and Jp).
5)
For each trace t, in traces(?), locate gi , = er, . Add gi(m.l) to set S.
6) For each trace ti in traces(lp), locate gin =e:,, . Add gi (n+l) to set F.
(tl E tJaces(F))
7) Compute the set difference K = S-F. This defines the complete set of events which must immediately precede the start of the atomic action. 8) Compute the set difference J = F-S. This defines the complete set of events which must immediately follow the end of the atomic action.
B. Justification of Algorithm 1
Initially, before algorithm 1 is executed:
The sequence of events in P, which are to be constituents of the atomic action are described as:
If all e; E L, then no interprocess communications occur.
Since the trace evaluation determines all possible traces, the sets S and F will both contain all possible events (in other processes) which may interleave with the events e: , -> . . . -> e:,, and determining the set difference will eliminate all these events. As expected, the atomic action is local to process P,.
If any e$ E C, then interprocess communications do occur and will synchronize both parties to the communication (since e$ E C, or e$ E C, , as well as C,). Suppose the communication event concems processes P, and P,. The interprocess communication must be intemal to the atomic action. The synchronization it causes will be evident in the trace evaluation. Again since the trace evaluation determines all possible traces, the set S will contain those events in the other process P, (equivalently P,) which can immediately precede the first communication with P, but cannot contain any event which must follow it. Likewise, the set F will contain those events in fects they have in the trace evaluation and are constrained to be intemal to the atomic action. It is argued above that the sets K and J contain the events which must precede and which must follow the atomic action and identifying the host process for process P, (equivalently Pr) which can immediately follow the last communication with P, but cannot contain any event which must precede it. Consequently, the set difference operations to give K and J will identify the events in other processes which form the entry line to and the exit line from the atomic action.
(Note: the notation J, K, F, S follows from [29] ) Algorithm 2 can be used to determine which processes are party to the atomic action. Hence the atomic action enclosing event cl includes processes P1 and P2, begins immediately after event a1 in process P1 and event bl in process P2, and terminates immediately before event a2 in process P1 and event b2 in process P2.
P3 p: AAP proceed. The trace evaluation proceeds to yield the eventual expansion given in Fig. 4 interleavings of a,",, ,b,.,,, d,,,, -or interleavings of ,bmr, di.,t,al, bl S = {al, bl, dl} since always precedes al, etc. i.e., the set of all possible immediately preceding "events" i.e., the set of all possible immediately F = {a2, b2, dl} t7=lnterleavingsof dImb2, dl t8 = 'nterleavlngs Of b3, d2 t9 = interleavings of a2, b3, d2 111 = interleavings of a2, b4, d3 ti2 = Interleavines of a2, b4, following "events" <t2,cl,t4,c2,b3,c4,t8,c3,tlI,JaII   <t2,cl,t4.c2,b3,c4,t9,c3,t12,Ja 1 1  <t2,cI,t4,c2,t5,c4,d2,c3,t12,Ja 1 1   <t2,Cl,t4,C2,t5,C4,tlO,C3,tl I,?   <t2,cl,t3,c2,t6,c4,t9,c3,t12,Ja 11   <t2,cl,t3,c2,t7,c4,d2,~3,tI2,$ c3->d2->c4 in P3; traces(fl includes < ..., c3, t8, c4, ... > and < ..., c3, t9, c4, ... > where t8 = interleavings of b3, d2, and t9 = interleavings of a2, b3, d2. For d2 alone:
However, if the proposed boundary has to enclose c3->d2, then K = (b2, dl} J = {b3, c4) and AAP = (P3) and AAP = {P2, P3) But if the proposed boundary has to include also the communication event c4, thus c3->d2->c4, then:
Consider now the example in Fig. 5 . In this system P2 communicates with P3 using c4 and P3 replies to P1 across c3. Suppose it is necessary to protect the sequence cl!->a2->c2?->a3 ->c3? in process P1. Then:
and AAP = {P2, P3) S={al,bl,dl} K=S F = (a4, b4, d3} J = F
EXAMPLE 5
Consider Fig. 6 , where F'= (PI 11 P2 11 P3 (1 P4) = ((PI 11 P2) 11 (P3 11 P4)) and alphabets a (PI 11 P2) and 01 (P3 11 P4) have no common event. Clearly, (PI 11 P2) is independent of (P3 11 P4).
Traces(2') must include all possible, arbitrary, interleaving of traces(P1 (1 P2) and traces(P3IIP4). One possible trace in and AAP = {Pl, P2, P3) traces(?) must be <any trace fiom traces(P1 11 P2), any trace from traces(P3 11 P4p. Likewise another possible trace must be <any trace fiom traces(P3 1) P4), any trace fiom traces(P1 11 P2)>. This can be determined by explicit trace evaluation.
For any combination of events in (PI (1 P2), both S and F must include a trace 60m traces(P3 11 P4), i.e., a (P3 11 P4). Hence, the set differences: K = S-F will eliminate cx (P3 11 P4), and J = F-S will eliminate cx (P3 11 P4). Hence no events in (P3 11 P4) contribute to an atomic action involving events solely in (P1 )) P2).
E. Nested Atomic Actions
Atomic actions must be nested correctly and any method for identifying atomic actions must recognize the proper nesting 1301. If a faulty identification is used in the design of software fault tolerant structures, then the scope for error propagation from one atomic action to another may not be eliminated, making error recovery incomplete, or a process may leave an atomic action prematurely making recovery impossible.
Consider two atomic actions AA, and AAb, with entry lines defied by K, and & and exit lines defmed by J, and Jb , following the defmitions of K and J above. Atomic action AA. encompasses the sequence of events between K, and J, and trace evaluation allows the designer to reason about the relative sequence of events withii the different processes within AA,. Let I denote a temporal precedence relationship within a trace.
1) If (Ja < Kb) then AA, happens before AAb, i.e., AA, < AAb.
2) If (Jb I K, J then happens before AA., i.e., AAb <AA,.
3) If (K, I Kb) A (Jb I JJ then AAb is nested correctly in 4) If (Kb < K,) A (J, < Jb) then AA. is nested correctly in These are the only conditions that constitute correctly nested atomic actions. Any other set of conditions will produce incorrect nesting.
F. Justification of Nested Atomic Actions
Algorithm I produces sets K and J, which identify the events in all the processes which form the entry line and the exit line from the atomic action. In addition, algorithm 2 has been shown to identify which processes are party to the atomic action. Thus, any atomic action, whether nested or not, identified by these algorithms will produce a correct and sufficient set of processes and will identify the entry and exit lines for these actions. It must therefore be the case that these algorithms, defined earlier, identify nested atomic actions correctly.
As an example of this, consider again the system described in Fig. 3 . Suppose it is required to identify two atomic actions in this system: AA,, i.e., AA, 2 AAb. A&, i.e., AAb a AA.. 1) to protect c 1 ->c2, in process P1, and 2) to protect c3->c4, in process P3.
This might be attempted (incorrectly) as shown in Fig. 7a . However, by using the algorithms described, the atomic action to protect c3->c4 is given by: K = {b2, dl} and J = (b4, d3). (Example 3) Similarly the atomic action to protect cl->c2 is given by: This actually gives the entry and exit lines shown in Fig. 7b . Thus, the outer atomic action encloses the inner action completely, making the nesting correct.
VII. STRUCTURAL ARGUMENTS IN ATOMIC ACTION IDENTIFICATION
The technique discussed so far requires full trace evaluations to identify atomic action boundaries. However, even with automated tools such as CoPla, the demands on system resources may become too great to allow full trace evaluations. For example CoPla requires 1.7MB of memory for the program, plus approximately (24 x number of traces x average length of trace) bytes for its data structures. Clearly, for realworld systems some means of avoiding full trace evaluation is advisable.
Structural arguments suggest that it is possible in many designs to avoid a full trace evaluation and still recognize atomic action boundaries. By and large the structure of the interprocess communications determines the location of atomic action boundaries. Local events (e.g., logical and arithmetic evaluation, and assignments) are of no interest, nor are constructs governing their sequence (such as loops and conditional selection constructs) if they contain no interprocess communication. Thus, for example, during trace evaluation any sequence of assignments can be collapsed into a single event, simplifying the analysis. It is possible to generate the sets J and K (and thus identify the boundaries) without the need for full trace evaluations.
It is assumed, as earlier, that the designer has chosen a sequence of consecutive events in one process (e$ -> . . .-> e& within process Pp). The sequence must be chosen to enclose fully any internal parallel or selection constructs, and the description must be well-structured (in the sense that it can be translated into an Occam implementation). The designer wishes to determine where the atomic action boundary which encloses this sequence must lie. More precisely, the question is which other processes are involved in the atomic action and where does the boundary lie within these processes. The following algorithm determines which events must be included within the atomic action, thereby allowing the designer to defme its boundary and to identify all other processes which must be party to the atomic action, without having to produce the complete trace set for the whole system.
A. Algorithm 3
The algorithm marks those events which must be party to the atomic action. Let {e:l, e:,}, the set of the fist and last events to be protected in process P, . a(Pp) has its usual meaning as the alphabet of the process P, . Then, define the primitive functions: TJX&J which determines whether its argument, "x," is a local event (localevent), a communication event (comm), a sequential process (SEQ), a parallel process, a choice process or a guarded choice process. Value(x) which expects an event as argument and returns its value (i.e., its name). Markedrx) which returns a BooIean indicating whether the event or process, "x," has already been recognized as part of the atomic action. InsertMark(x) will cause Marked(x) to return TRUE on its next call.
Llst(N) which is an ordered list of the events in the process given as its argument (effectively the trace restricted to the events in process N).
The following auxiliary functions simplify the analysis:
Markraj modifies the marked attribute of its argument, "a," setting it to the value TRUE; if the element is a communication event then the other participant is also marked. Mark(a):
2) (Type(x) = comm)-> (y := Partner(x)); Mark@); 3) result := TRUE; ment, returns the other participant.
Partner0
Partnerral, given a communication event "a" as argu-
SequentiallyPostDependent(a, b. N) determines whether event "b" is sequentially post dependent on "a"; in other words whether "b" must necessarily occur after "a" has finished. (x>y means that "x" occurs after ''y" in the ordered list of N).
Then the function FindAA:
Step 1) Marks all the events in the set of events E which have to be protected. Step2) Ensures that all events between any two events that have to be executed in sequence are included within the boundary. For each marked event x in P, for each marked event y which is sequentially post dependent on x, mark all the events which are sequentially between x and y.
Step 3) Ensures that all processes can exit at the same time.
For each marked event x in P: (a) define the empty set H. Insert into H all nonmarked communication events y that are sequentially post dependent of x. Include both participants. For each element y of the set H, for each event z that is sequentially post dependent of y:
(b) if z is marked then mark y. If there has been any newly marked event then reiteration of step 2 is needed. (c) if z is not marked and it is a communication event then if z or its partner do not belong to H include them and reiterate step 3b.
FindAA():
Step 1) (Vx) 1 (x E E)+Mark(x)
Step 2)
Step 3) (Vx) I (x E (a(P))) A (Marked(x)) b) (goto2)+go to step 2a
goto3.b := TRUE; d) (goto3.b)+go to step 3.b
Step 4) (goto2)+go to step 2 The algorithm seeks out communication pattems amongst the set of processes in an iterative fashion and deliberately examines the sequential dependence of communications in the system. It uses this sequential dependence to examine not only all direct communications with the original sequence requiring protection, between the events in set E, but also any subsequent communications (set H) from processes with which events in E have had contact. It determines whether these subsequent communications have structural implications which require their inclusion in the atomic action. The algorithm'iterates until no further events are identified for inclusion in the atomic action.
The algorithm progressively marks those events in the complete set of processes which should be included in the atomic action. The final step is to generate the set AAe which identifies the events constituting the atomic action, and the set AAP to determine which processes are necessarily party to the atomic action. Atomic actions can be readily identified without the need to evaluate the traces given in Fig. 4. EXAMPLE 1 REVISITED Suppose it is decided to protect event cl. Hence E = (cl}. Step 2 leads to no new markings, and consequently the algorithm gives AAe = {cl) and AAP = {PI, P2). In other words the atomic action enclosing event cl includes only the event cl in both processes P1 and P2. This is consistent with the earlier analysis that the atomic action begins immediately after event a1 in process P1 and event bl in process P2, and terminates immediately before event a2 in process PI and event b2 in process P2.
EXAMPLES 2A, 28,2C REVISITED In a similar way, these produce analogous results to those produced earlier using algorithm 1.
EXAMPLE 3 REVISITED
Here the designer has the opportunity of selecting to protect either d2 alone, but to include other events in the sequence c3 -> d2->c4 in P3. For E = {d2), algorithm 3 quickly terminates with AAe = {d2) as the sole constituent of the atomic action. However, if E = {c3, d2) were selected, then step 1 would cause the following marking: giving AAe = {d2, c4) and AAP = {P2, P3). However, if E = {c3, c4) were selected, then step 1 and step 2 would cause the following marking: As before, suppose it is decided to protect the sequence cl!->a2->~2?->a3->~3? in process P1, i.e., E = {cl, c3). Then step 1 causes the marking: Step 2 now causes the marking: Now step 3a looks at the unmarked communications events, to form the set H = {c4!, c4?).
Step 3b would discover that c3! in process P3 is marked and sequentially post dependent, leading to the marking: No further markings are generated by the remaining steps, leading to the conclusion that AAe = {a2, a3, cl, c2, c3, c4, b2,b3,d2) andAAP= {pl,p2,p3).
B. Complexity of the Algorithms
The full trace algorithm (algorithm 1) would show exponential complexity with the number of processes during trace production if there were no synchronizing communications present. When communications are added, each communication forces synchronization between two processes, eliminates part of the trace set, and thus reduces complexity. Every communication reduces the size of the trace set significantly, and similarly the time required to search. Thus:
Given n processes, each with m events, and 0 comms: Given n processes, each with m events, and 1 comms:
Given n processes, each with m events, and p comms:
Searching is approximately linear with the size of the trace set, since the algorithm is simply scanning the trace sets.
In algorithm 3, this initial complexity does not appear as traces are not explicitly produced. Instead, complexity arises in searching across communication links to identify atomic action boundaries. Algorithm 3 shows a near linear complexity, but whenever sequential post dependency forces backtracking the analysis becomes less obvious. If there were no backtracking, then the complexity would be linearly dependent on the number of events (n*m). Every time the algorithm has to backtrack, it is effectively analogous to regenerating a further set of traces to search. Thus, if there are q backtracking occurrences, then the complexity increases to n*m*q. 
IX. A REAL WORLD EXAMPLE
Simple examples as shown above can have their trace sequences evaluated "by hand" and boundary identification can be achieved by inspection of the trace sets. For larger, more realistic examples manual methods become manageably complex. The CoPla software tool has been used to produce trace sets for a number of more complex systems and then used to identify atomic action boundaries. One application, a robot arm manipulator, (Fig. 8 ) has been modeled [25] and implemented as a set of 12 parallel processes. A slightly simplified version expressed in CSP is shown in Fig. 9 ; following initialization, each process engages in an infinite loop, all synchronized by communications. (The CSP description expands to an actual implementation comprising about 10,000 lines of occam code). Automated analysis reveals 184,900 possible traces; CoPla then allows the user to propose entry and exit points for an atomic action within one of the processes and uses the algorithms described earlier to determine the proper boundaries of the atomic action.
For example, consider the requirement to locate an atomic action boundary which encloses c15 to c9 inclusively in process ARM. CoPla gives the following results: (c15, m2, c16, c17, c18, c19, c20, c21, c6, c9) allowing the sets K and J to be derived as:
K= {bl, dl, e2, hl,jl, kl, 11); events which must precede the atomic action boundary, and events which must follow the atomic action boundary. J = (b2, d2, e3, h2, j2, k2,12};
X. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has proposed two methods for identifying atomic actions in systems described using CSP. If explicit trace evaluation is tractable, then algorithms 1 and 2 provide the designer with a systematic method of locating atomic action boundaries in a hierarchical fashion, essentially by analyzing the possible sequences of interprocess communications within the trace sets. The second method (algorithm 3) takes the original CSP descriptions of the system and uses structural arguments to identify the atomic action boundaries; this method does not suffer the drawbacks involved in full trace evaluation, but does incur the penalty of a more complex algorithm.
Both techniques identify those events which are constituent to a proposed atomic action and eliminate all processes that are disjoint from the atomic action; both techniques allow nested atomic actions to be identified correctly. However, an analysis based on structural arguments has a number of attractions. By avoiding a full trace evaluation or a full reachability analysis, the method is more economical on computational time and memory resources. But, it depends implicitly on the ability to analyze the sequence in which events could occur, which is akin to the ability to generate the complete set of traces. It cannot therefore be used with an arbitrary set of communicating processes; the designer is restricted to processes formed solely from sequential, parallel, conditional and general choice constructs of simple events and communications. Nevertheless, the algorithms have been applied to systems which include restricted forms of program loops. For example, the robot manipulator arm processes are normally invoked from within an infinite control loop, but since the iterations begin and end synchronously, the analysis can be applied without prejudice.
In the examples shown in the paper the processes only have one trace. However, multiple traces (and thus some form of nondeterminism) are easily included into the design by considering each altemative individually, although this will obviously increase the overall number of traces that will be produced. When the problem of atomic action placement is addressed, for such situations, the main point is that the complete "nondeterministic" structure (such as an Occam ALT) must be included in the atomic action.
Both methods operate directly on the CSP description of the system. They require no error prone translation of a developed program into graphical form, nor is there an implied simulation of program execution based on the graphical structures. Furthermore, translation of the CSP design to an occam implementation is generally straightforward (since problematic features such as interrupts are excluded) because of the close family relationship between Occam and CSP, or alternatively, hardware implementations can be developed directly from the CSP design with only modest difficulty.
The underlying motivation of this research is to develop a mechanism for introducing software fault tolerance structures in a systematic, proper, fashion. Atomic action identification is just the first, crucial, step in that process.
